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Editorial
 Education Reform: Why and How
The SAR Government has repeatedly emphasised
its commitment to strengthen Hong Kong's education
system. This deserves applause and praise. Hong Kong's
education system is truly in need of a fix, and education
reform is far too important to be put off to a future date.
There are three magic words for a quality
education system: Motivation, Autonomy, and Funding.
Students, teachers, schools, and parents must be
motivated to do their parts. Students have to feel happy
about their studies. Teachers need autonomy to realise
their creativity and innovativeness. Schools have to be
adequately funded so as to have the needed support by
way of staffing, equipment and clerical/technical
assistance.
Our biggest complaint about the HK educational
system for years has been the premature pressure on
students before they reach the age of nine to drill for
examinations which will ultimately determine whether
they would be assigned to band 1 if they are successful or
band 5 schools if they turn out to be "flops." While the
public is agreed that this is a serious problem, they do not
appreciate the fact that the problem does not arise from
examinations, but from the system of "banding." If we do
away with examinations but retain such a system of
banding, then we will retain the system of high pressure
"education." That is why we insist that we should only
retain two bands: the outstanding band--the top 20 per
cent of students and the rest. This avoids labelling
students as flops but awards the top student with the
opportunity of choosing their own schools. This system
will allow teachers to motivate students better. Because
under such a system secondary schools will generally
source their students across a wide but similar spectrum of
abilities they will compete on a level playing field.
Provided this system is implemented, and schools
are given greater autonomy and a level playing field to
compete for excellence, and adequate resource is provided
to back up the actual delivery of education, we are
optimistic about Hong Kong's education system.
The Centre for Public Policy Studies is co-
organising an International Workshop on Education
Reform with the Chinese University's Faculty of
Education and the Hong Kong Institute of Education on
June 12 and June 13. Further details are available on our
website: www.ln.edu.hk/cpps/info/confer.htm. It is
expected that the workshop will produce interesting and
thought-provoking papers on the following subjects.
1) Alternative models of financing and management.
The role of market forces, professional autonomy,
vs. bureaucratic control.
2) Curriculum reform, assessment, teaching methods,
and motivation.
3) Parent/student participation in school management.
4) Medium of instruction: autonomy versus directives
from bureaucrats.
5) Teachers’ education and quality assurance.
6) The process of education reform, public participation,
and perspectives from policy analysis.
________________________________________________________________________________________________
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??????????????
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Abstract
There are four main themes in the 10th Five Year
Plan of China. First, there will be a change from relying
on the Government to relying on market forces as the
driving force in social and economic development.
Second, the Plan is more in the nature of an indicative or
projected developments rather than in the nature of
directives from the top. Third, the main focus will be on
economic adjustment and restructuring to facilitate
integration with the global markets and the global
economy. Fourth, the Government will take on more
responsibility and accountability.
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Abstract
In the face of structural change, Hong Kong’s future
economic development, according to the Chief Executive,
should rely on high technology and high growth sectors.
The aim of this article is to point out that while
formulating and implementing high-tech public policy,
the government should bear in mind that high-tech public
policy should be compatible with Hong Kong’s internal
economic and industrial structures. In addition,
experiences from the United States in high-tech public
policy implementation suggest that a delicate balance
between private market force and maximizing policy
objectives must be maintained.
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A Miscarriage of Housing Policy
 in Hong Kong
Lok Sang Ho
Director, Centre for Public Policy Studies
??
?????????????????????
???????????????????????
???????????????????????
?????????? 98 ???????????
December 8, 1997 was a day that all Hong Kong
belongers should remember.  On that fateful date the
Housing Authority announced the Tenant Purchase
Scheme (TPS), which was part of a strategy to raise Hong
Kong’s home ownership ratio to 70 per cent in 10 years,
as Mr. Tung Chee-hwa pledged in his first Policy
Address.
I was very disappointed in the way the public
housing privatisation scheme was designed.  I found it
unfair and wasteful of taxpayers’ money.  I immediately
wrote an article, which was published in the SCMP on 30
December 1997,  arguing that public housing flats should
be sold only to those who qualify for housing subsidy and
should be resalable only to those who also so qualify.  I
was disappointed by the reversal of the “Richer Tenants
Pay Higher Rent Policy”, officially dubbed “Housing
Subsidy Policy” —  which was implemented starting from
April 1987.  By allowing richer tenants buy their units
cheaply the policy reversed a widely acclaimed though
politically difficult policy.  Since the flats sold will be
forever lost to the people waiting in the queue taxpayers
will have to find resources to build more units.
On deeper analysis, I discovered that the TPS was
not only flawed but also devastating in its effects.  I wrote
an article, the titled of which was chosen by the Editor
from the body of my piece and read “Policy Blunder of the
Century”. (March 24, 1998) I argued that the TPS
immediately reduced the attractiveness of Home
Ownership Scheme (HOS) housing and eliminated a large
segment of potential HOS buyers from the market.  That
would lead to a plunge in the value of HOS housing and
disabled their owners from trading up.  If HOS owners —
and there were almost 300,000 of them —  could not trade
up, Hong Kong’s housing market would have a hard time,
because those who depend on HOS owners to buy their
units also cannot trade up.  I predicted a plunge in housing
market turnover, and I predicted serious fiscal problems
for Hong Kong in the years ahead.  I immediately received
compliments from various people, including one
developer, one university professor, and a number of
citizens who wrote or phoned me.  But many people were
not convinced.  The Director of Housing, Mr. Tony Miller,
for one, was not convinced.  Still others were close to
condemning me for vindicating a “high land price policy.”
Deep in my mind I wished I was wrong.  But the
first quarter of 1998 registered an unprecedented decline
in Hong Kong’s GDP.  The drop was so big that it virtually
guaranteed that the year’s growth was negative.  People
easily blamed the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) for it.  But
I am positive that the TPS has a role. It was difficult to
disentangle the two effects, but consider the following
facts.
The AFC was essentially a case of a
number of ASEAN currencies depreciating
dramatically.  Why did this hurt Hong Kong
so much?  Our biggest trading partners were
the US and China, both of which were doing
________________________________________________________________________________________________
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just fine.  It is true that Hong Kong’s
overnight interest rates had jumped
dramatically in October 1997 when the Hong
Kong dollar was attacked. But lending rates
for homebuyers and other borrowers were
much more stable.  More important, not even
one bank failed.
Hong Kong had gone through far worse financial
crises with multiple bank failures before and had managed
to register positive growth every year since 1962, when
Hong Kong first had GDP growth figures.  While the
Hang Seng Index did plunge badly, the plunge could not
compare with the 90 per cent loss from 1973 to 1975.
Where is the transmission mechanism that produced such
dramatic decline in the economy?  We had such strong
fundamentals (strong fiscal balance, strong international
reserves, strong banks, a free market, etc.), but we did
almost as badly as heavily indebted and almost insolvent
South Korea in 1998 (which shrank by 5.8, worse than our
5.3 per cent decline), and considerably worse than South
Korea in 1999 (which grew about 10 per cent, much better
than our 3.2 per cent growth).
In several SCMP articles that followed the “Policy
Blunder” article, I argued that TPS resulted in extremely
low turnover in the housing market, and that low turnover
in the housing market hurt a number of sectors badly: real
estate brokers, developers, banks, decorators, furniture
makers, retailers, lawyers, restaurants, movers,
accountants, etc.  While I was making my case, the Home
Ownership Scheme fell into deep trouble.  For the first
time in all of its history since 1978 thousands of buyers
gave up and lost their deposits.  Hundreds and thousands
of buyers resold their units to the Housing Authority at the
original purchase price— which became much higher than
the market price.  With a decline in subscription, many
HOS units were turned into rental units— which is quite
an irony when juxtaposed against the sale of rental public
units under TPS.
In short, TPS is the culprit, not AFC,
behind Hong Kong’s economic downturn,
the collapse of Hong Kong’s housing market,
and the emergence of hundreds of thousands
of negative equity homeowners.
I have tested statistically the relative contribution of
TPS and the AFC in explaining the dramatic downturn in
housing market turnover.  The evidence clearly supported
my hypothesis.
Moreover, while everybody blamed speculators for
the creation of the property market bubble I found that the
main reason behind the surge of property prices prior to
1997 was also public housing policy.  Hong Kong had
protected hundreds of thousands of public housing tenants
from high rent.  This had allowed them to accumulate
huge savings, ready to be ploughed into the housing
market.  The policy to make richer tenants pay higher,
even market rent, had driven many of them to snap up
homes and particularly to buy HOS housing.  When HOS
owners found that their units could fetch good prices they
could also pay good prices for better, more expensive
homes.  This explained the high turnover and the surge in
prices.  Speculators played a relatively minor role.  The
“richer tenants pay more rent” policy was a good policy.
If we accept this policy, we should also accept the results
of the policy.  The results are higher home prices.  Higher
home prices is not a problem, as long as the government is
fiscally in the position to house the poor in public housing
of an acceptable standard.
Some people worry about high home
prices reducing Hong Kong’s
competitiveness.  Such worry is misplaced.
Throughout the world, can we find a place
that enjoys strong competitiveness, low taxes,
high incomes, high degree of freedom, high
political stability, and low housing prices?
If a place is so attractive, the entire world would like
to live there, home prices had to be high!  Hong Kong
should stop worrying about the level of wages and prices
in order to enhance its competitiveness.  Hong Kong’s
competitiveness must be built on high productivity, free
markets, an efficient government, and a well-educated
and highly motivated workforce.  To engineer low wages,
________________________________________________________________________________________________
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low prices, and low home prices is to admit failure and to
give up the fight to increase competitiveness.
Hong Kong certainly is up to the challenge!
2001 ?????????
???
??????????????????
?  ?
??????????????
Abstract
The outlook of the Chinese economy in 2001 is
subject to three different scenarios. The first is an
optimistic one, with economic growth projected to
accelerate in the short term, ultimately hitting 8 to 9 per
cent. The second is more cautious, expecting economic
growth to consolidate at around 7.5 to 8 per cent. The third
is relatively pessimistic, with growth decelerating to
perhaps 7 to 7.5 per cent. This author takes the cautiously
optimistic view, and outlines the positive factors and
difficulties that beset the economy.
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Agency Business Diversification in
Chinese Technology New Ventures
Haiyang Li
Assistant Professor, Department of Marketing and
International Business
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China’s transition to market economy has produced
new opportunities, for entrepreneurs and stimulated the
development of new ventures.  This is particularly true in
high technology industries where the government has
given significant attention and provided strong resource
backing. From 1988 to 1995, over 100 high technology
experimental zones were established across the country.
There are over 60 national engineering technology
research centres and over 70 high technology
entrepreneurship centres, which incubate and foster new
technology ventures. In China, high technology firms
within the experimental zones enjoy the government’s
preferential policies in terms of sales tax, equipment
importing, land use and others to develop and market new
products both in the local and export markets.
Extant research suggests that the core strategy for
improving performance of technology ventures is by
developing and marketing new products. Product
innovation is seen as the principal source of competitive
advantage, because it allows technology ventures to gain
greater financial independence and enhanced market
performance to increase the likelihood of survival. Yet
product innovation is a high risk and resource consuming
activity, especially for new firms, given highly uncertain
technologies, new and underdeveloped markets and rapid
obsolescence. Hence, there is considerable uncertainty
about the success of product innovation strategy as a
source of growth for these firms.
Particularly, technology ventures in
China’s transitional economy, compared to
their counterparts in market economies, are
much more constrained by limited financial
resources as well as limited technical,
managerial, and marketing capacities.
Our interviews with CEOs from several ventures in
China suggest that one of the most prevalent strategies is
for the ventures to become the agents for foreign firms
(e.g., multinational corporations (MNCs)) in the Chinese
market. For example, a Chinese computer software
company may help MNCs to distribute computers or
healthcare equipment; or a hardware company may
become an agent of MNCs ’ products to provide parts,
components, or other elements of the firm’s product line
(e.g., selling hard drives in order to provide maintenance
or upgrade potential for a firm’s line of computers). We
label this practice as agency business diversification and
define it as a strategy by which technology ventures
choose to invest in importing and wholesaling other
firms ’ (e.g., MNCs ’) products/services. Anecdotal
evidence has shown that a significant number of
technology ventures in China are adopting this strategy to
help ensure their survival. A report on technology firms in
China’s Beijing High Technology Experimental Zone
(BHEZ) shows that sales from agency business as a
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percentage of total sales for these firms was 74% in 1989,
60% in 1991, and 57.4% in 1995, respectively (BHEZ
Office, 1995).
By using a sample of 184 technology ventures in
BHEZ, we investigated why technology ventures in China
adopt agency business diversification and how the
adoption of this strategy relates to their product
innovation and performance. Results of the study show
that environmental uncertainty is positively related to the
adoption of agency business diversification whereas
industry growth is negatively related to such adoption.
However, when institutional support is stronger,
environmental uncertainty is negatively related to the
ventures ’ adoption of this strategy. The findings suggest
that agency business diversification represents a strategic
choice by technology ventures for resource acquisition
which is driven by environmental uncertainty in China’s
transitional economy. The reason is that in a transitional
economy characterised as underdeveloped institutions,
when alternative sources of resource are lacking, new
ventures tend to seek network relationships with external
firms (e.g., MNCs) in order to obtain resources and
legitimacy.
Findings of the study also indicate that the
consequences of agency business diversification are two-
edged. On the one hand, the higher the proportion of
agency business activities in a venture’s businesses, the
better the venture’s market performance (based on both
objective and subjective measures). On the other hand, the
higher level of agency business diversification tends to
have negative impact on the ventures ’ product innovation
activity.
The message for practitioners is clear.
Though technology ventures can get benefits
from agency business diversification,
managers have to be very careful with the
dysfunctional impact of this strategy on
product innovations.
Particularly in China, technology ventures are
viewed as the window for product innovations and they
enjoy much preferential policies for their innovation
activities. When agency business diversification is
successful and becomes larger, it may be difficult for these
ventures to change course and focus on long-term
technological innovation.
__________________________________
The Lingnan Commentary is jointly published by the
Hong Kong Institute of Business Studies, the Centre
for Asian Pacific Studies and the Centre for Public
Policy Studies of Lingnan University, four times
each year in January, April, July and October. Views
expressed in The Lingnan Commentary are those of
the authors only and may not represent Lingnan
University’s.
The Lingnan Commentary Editorial Board:
Advisor : Professor Edward K.Y. CHEN
Editor-in-Chief : Professor Lok Sang HO
Editors : Professor Mee Kau NYAW
Professor Tsang Sing CHAN
Professor Yak Yeow KUEH
Dr. Clement K.W. CHOW
Contact information:
Publishing and distribution:
Hong Kong Institute of Business Studies,
Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong
Tel : (852) 2616 8373
Fax : (852) 2572 4171
Email : hkibs@ln.edu.hk
Editorial:
Centre for Public Policy Studies,
Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong
Tel : (852) 2616 7433
Fax : (852) 2591 0690
Email : cpps@ln.edu.hk
The Lingnan Commentary can also be read on-line
at: http://www.library.ln.edu.hk/etext/lnc/lnc.html
